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First Let's Sue All the Lawyers-
What Will We Get: Damages for
Estate Planning Malpractice
by
MARTIN D. BEGLEITER*
Introduction
About ten years ago, I authored an article on malpractice in
estate planning.' That article reviewed in detail the revolution in
malpractice litigation in the estate planning area, attempted to predict
issues which were likely to arise in future malpractice litigation, and
suggested some links between the decline in the public opinion of
attorneys and the growth in malpractice litigation.2
In the years since the publication of that article, I have received a
number of telephone inquiries as to whether, in the course of writing
that article, I had done any significant research on the damages
recoverable in estate planning malpractice. My 1990 article does not
discuss the damages question3 and, indeed, I did not focus on that
question during my research. The number of inquiries, however,
indicated that the issue did concern lawyers and that little work
existed on the subject. This article attempts to fill that void.
Following a very brief review of the developments in malpractice
liability in the estate planning area4 and a statement of the general
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. B.A., 1967, University of
Rochester; J.D. 1970, Cornell University. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge
the assistance of Dean C. Peter Goplerud, III, of Drake University Law School for the
award of a Summer Research Stipend, which aided the preparation of this Article. The
author thanks Robert T. Kleinknecht, Drake Law School Class of 1999, and Kent P.
Barnes, Drake Law School Class of 2001, for their valuable assistance in the research and
preparation of this article. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this Article, as well
as any errors, are, of course, those of the author.
1. See Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-You've Got to
Know When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 KAN. L. REv. 193 (1990).
2. See generally id.
3. See id.
4. See infra Part II. I intend a broad definition of the term "estate planning" in this
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rules of damages recoverable in malpractice actions involving estate
planning,5 I will discuss the two major types of damages recoverable
in estate planning malpractice cases: the loss of the bequest 6 and the
costs to repair the error.7 The subject of whether attorneys fees are
recoverable in these actions has generated substantial argument and
will be discussed separately.8 In certain types of cases, primarily
marital deduction trusts, whether damages will occur, and the amount
of the damage, may not be ascertainable when the malpractice is
discovered.9 The question of whether a plaintiff in such a case can
recover against the attorney because the damages are "speculative"
will be considered and some possibilities for either postponing the
litigation or allowing recovery will be discussed.' 0
I. Summary Of Developments In Estate Planning Malpractice
A. Privity
Until 1960, rarely was an attorney subject to liability to
disappointed beneficiaries in a will case, regardless of the error made
by the attorney." The reason was that only those in privity with the
drafter of the will had standing to sue the drafter for malpractice.' 2
The beneficiaries under a defectively executed will or the intended
beneficiaries under a deficiently drafted will had no contractual
relationship with the drafting attorney and therefore could not bring
article. Therefore, as used herein, that term includes wills, trusts, the administration of
estates, conservatorship, and tax planning primarily involving the estate, gift and
generation-skipping taxes. Reference will also be made to cases involving guardianship
and other tax issues, if such cases shed light on the rules to be followed in estate planning
cases, although these matters are usually not included in the definition of "estate
planning."
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VII.
9. The marital deduction area is the area in which most of the cases of this type have
arisen. However, a similar problem could arise in other areas. Two such areas are special
use valuation and the newly enacted family owned business provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code [hereinafter I.R.C.]. See I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057. For a discussion of
possible malpractice errors in special use valuation, see Begleiter, supra note 1, at 237-39,
250-57. I am not aware of any case involving attorney malpractice in special use valuation
which has squarely confronted the issue of whether errors in planning or electing special
use valuation or involving the section's recapture provisions constitute malpractice. See
Sass v. Hanson, 554 N.W.2d 642 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); Wilson v. Cherry, 612 N.E.2d 953
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (both decided on other grounds).
10. See infra Parts VIII, IX.
11. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 194-95.
12. See id. at 195.
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an action against the attorney. 13 In 1961, the famous California case
of Lucas v. HamM14 changed that rule by making the question of
whether the beneficiaries could sue the attorney a question of public
policy.15 In evaluating the factors taken into account in making the
decision,16 most courts found that a cause of action by the
beneficiaries was available.17 Following the lead of Pennsylvania, a
smaller group of states viewed the issue as a contract question, basing
the determination on whether the plaintiffs were intended third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the attorney and the testator.18
As of 1999, only six states retained a rule of absolute privity
prohibiting beneficiaries under a will or trust from bringing a
malpractice action against the drafting attorney. 9 A small group of
states, apparently misapprehending the nature of a malpractice
recovery, limited the bringing of a malpractice action to cases where
the attorney admitted the error or where the error was evident on the
face of the will.2
13. See id.
14. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). For a discussion of
Lucas, see Begleiter, supra note 1, at 195-96.
15. See Lucas, 364 P.2d at 686-87.
16. In restating the rule it was said that:
[t]he determination of whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing
future harm.
Since defendant was authorized to practice the profession of an attorney, we
must consider an additional factor not present in [Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16
(Cal. 1958)], namely, whether the recognition of liability to beneficiaries of wills
negligently drawn by attorneys would impose an undue burden on the profession.
Id.
17. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 196-98.
18. See id. at 204-06. This view has gained popularity recently. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp.
v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d
1289 (Or. 1987).
19. The states are Nebraska, New York, Texas, Virginia, Ohio and, since 1998,
Maryland. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 196-97 nn.20-24. For Maryland, see Noble v.
Bruce, 709 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1998).
20. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 198-204. Distressingly, the number of states
adopting this limit and its erroneous rationale has grown since 1990. See, e.g., Glover v.
Southard, 894 P.2d 21 (Colo. App. 1994); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1996).
I hope to treat this in more detail in a future article. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73, illus. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 8 (1997)). Illustration 3 makes
it clear that extrinsic evidence is allowed to establish the intent to benefit the non-client.
However, the Restatement requires clear and convincing evidence of the client's intent to
support an action by the non-client.
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B. Statute of Limitations
Another roadblock to malpractice actions was the rule that the
cause of action accrued on the date the error was made.21 In a will,
this was the date the will was drafted (or, at the latest, was
executed).22 Since a will does not become effective until testator dies,
the malpractice statute of limitations often expired before the will
became effectiveP3 Shortly after the changing of the privity rule, a
California court held that the statute of limitations accrued only when
testator died, that being the date the injury occurred and a remedy
became available.24 Since then, some courts have gone further and
applied the discovery rule25 or the continuous representation rule26 to
estate planning malpractice cases.
C. Types of Errors
The earliest cases decided involved simple errors. Examples of
such cases included wills which were invalid due to execution failures
(such as interested witnesses or insufficient witnesses).27 Almost all
such cases held that a malpractice action by a beneficiary under such
a will survived a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment?8 Similarly, plaintiffs won most (though not all) cases of
misdescribed beneficiaries, omission of provisions and similar drafting
errors. 29 Later, cases involving more complicated legal errors, such as
violations of the rule against perpetuities, arose.30 Again, plaintiffs
tended to succeed in such cases.31 However, as closer cases began to
arise in the last ten years, attorneys have begun to prevail more
frequently in malpractice actions.32 Plaintiffs have also enjoyed a
21. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 208-09.
22. See id. at 209.
23. See id. at 209-10.
24. See id. at 210-11.
25. The discovery rule begins the running of the statute of limitations when the
plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the injury, the cause of the injury, and the
attorney's negligence. See id. at 211-12.
26. This involves cases in which the attorney continues to represent the estate or the
beneficiaries with regard to the matter on which the error occurred (here, the will or trust
instrument). See id. at 216-18. There are not many cases applying this doctrine to estate
planning malpractice. For an interesting case presenting a very liberal interpretation of
the doctrine, see Dudden v. Goodman, 543 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
27. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 218-22.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 222-28.
30. See id. at 229-32.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 254-55. The more recent cases involve determining the scope of the
attorney's duty. Often the cases are decided heavily on the facts involved. See, e.g.,
Leipham v. Adams, 894 P.2d 576 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Hargett v. Holland, 447 S.E.2d
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great deal of success in cases involving tax and estate planning
errors.33 In estate administration cases, executors have won cases
against attorneys for failure to file tax returns,34 and in other
situations of delay in acting or failure to act.35 An interesting current
area is the impact of an ethics violation on the malpractice action.
3 6
D. The Significance of Malpractice in Estate Planning
There is no question that malpractice litigation has greatly
increased since the 1970's. 7 There is also evidence that attorney
malpractice has significantly increased over the same period.38 And,
of more interest to estate planners, malpractice claims in the estate,
probate and trust area accounted for 7.59 percent of all malpractice
claims from 1990-95.39 This reflected a .62% increase from the data
784 (N.C. 1994); Davis v. Somers, 915 P.2d 1047 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Stangland v. Brock,
747 P.2d 464 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634 (S.C. 1991). See also
cases cited infra note 36. I hope to discuss these cases in more detail in a future article.
33. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 233-42. This success has continued in recent cases.
See, e.g., Kinney v. Shinholser, 663 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Williams v. Ely,
668 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1996); Creighton Univ. v. Kleinfeld, 919 F. Supp. 1421 (E.D. Cal.
1995); Jewish Hosp. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
34. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 249-52. The most often litigated question in this
area is whether the beneficiaries may sue the "attorney for the estate (or trust)." This, in
turn, depends on who the attorney for the estate represents. I hope to discuss the question
in a subsequent article because it is closely related to the effect of a violation of ethical
rules on malpractice. See infra note 36.
35. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 249-50.
36. This has become perhaps the most often-discussed question in estate planning
malpractice in the last ten years. The ethical rules can be used directly or indirectly. The
direct use of the ethical rules involves the question of whether a violation of the ethical
rules is in and of itself malpractice. See id. at 252-53. The indirect effects involve three
different questions:
A. The scope of the attorney's duty. These cases involve questions such as delay
in execution see, e.g., Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988); Radovich
v. Locke-Paddon, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Ct. App. 1995); Chaira v. Hulse, 619 So.
2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 1993) and Gregg v. Lindsay, 649 A.2d 935 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994) and the duty to investigate capacity see, e.g., Logotheti v. Gordon, 607
N.E.2d 1015 (Mass. 1993).
B. The question of whether a beneficiary can sue the attorney for the estate for
malpractice committed during estate administration.
C. The use of ethical rules as support for the adoption of a strict privity rule.
Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 264 (Md. 1998).
See THE IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW SECTION
SEMINAR (October 16, 1998) (outline of Martin D. Begleiter) (copy on file with the
author). I hope to treat these matters in detail in a subsequent article.
37. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 193,263-74.
38. See Lynn Curtis, Comment Changing Standards of Third-Party Liability in Estate
Planning, 66 UMKC L. REV. 863,863 (1998).
39. See AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMrITEE ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE 1990's 7. It should be
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from 1983-85.4o The area ranked seventh of twenty-five areas
discussed, 41 but the increase from the 1983-85 figures to the 1990-95
figures was the sixth greatest.42 Therefore, the estate planning area
contributes significantly to the overall malpractice claims. It should
also be noted that forty percent of the malpractice claims in this area
involved preparation of documents and an additional sixteen percent
were characterized as advice.43 Interestingly, thirty percent of the
claims were abandoned or resulted in no payment and an additional
twenty-two percent resulted in the action being dismissed or a
judgment in favor of the attorney.44 Payment to the claimant as a
result of a settlement occurred in forty-eight percent of the claims.45
A judgment for the claimant resulting in payment occurred in less
than one percent of the claims.46
Therefore, one might ask: why be concerned with damages?
First, the damages recoverable are clearly significant in negotiating
settlements, which resulted in payment in almost half of the claims.47
Second, the frequency of the cases and the payouts are relevant to
malpractice insurance rates. Even more significant is the perception
of lawyers' ability by the public and the legal community's reaction to
the public's growing doubts about lawyer quality.48 Finally, even
though the vast majority of payments are under $10,00049 and
involved small law firms,50 some large recoveries did occur 5' and
ninety-six percent of the law firms in the United States are
comparable in size to the law firms involved in the majority of cases
(one to five attorneys).52 Moreover, the reaction of the public to
revelations of malpractice probably has repercussions for attorneys
noted that malpractice claims arising from gift and estate tax matters are included in this
category. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 8.
43. See id. at 36.
44. See id. at 37.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 264-71.
49. See MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, supra note 39, at 15. Almost 64% of the claims paid
resulted in payments between $0 and $1,000. 12.37% of the payments were between
$1,001 and $5,000; 6.48% were between $5,001 and $10,000; 8.10% were between $10,001
and $25,000; 4.59% were between $25,001 and $50,000; 2.68% were between $50,001 and
$100,000; and 1.83% were over $100,000. See id.
50. See Curtis, supra note 38, at 864. Sixty-one percent of the claims in the area were
against firms with five attorneys or less. See id.
51. See supra note 49. Moreover, large recoveries (in excess of $100,000) are likely to
generate substantial publicity.
52. See Curtis, supra note 38, at 864.
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far beyond the significance of the problem and certainly well beyond
the percentage of successful claimants.
53
H. General Measure of Damages in Legal Malpractice Actions
The general standard of damages in legal malpractice actions is
not subject to dispute. In general, the damage recoverable is the
amount of plaintiff's loss. 54 In the estate planning area, this is usually
the value of the intended bequest.5 5 It should be noted that if the
plaintiff received some portion of the estate despite the negligence of
the attorney (usually through intestacy), the recovery is reduced by
the amount otherwise received.56 Alternatively, if the beneficiary
takes action to reduce the damage, the expenses of so doing
(including attorneys fees) would constitute the damages.5 7
The case law yields similar definitions. One court stated: "In a
legal malpractice action, a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages
proximately resulting from the negligent conduct of the attorney.
Consequential damages that are foreseeable are likewise recoverable
upon proof of breach of contract. 58
53. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 269-71. Large recoveries against lawyers are no
doubt given more prominence by the media than cases in which lawyers are exonerated. It
is also possible that malpractice charges against attorneys are more extensively publicized
than the results of such cases, particularly when the attorney is found blameless or a small
settlement is agreed to in order to avoid litigation.
54. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 31.09,
at 115-16 (4th ed. 1996).
55. See id. § 31.7, at 109. See infra Part IV.
56. See id.
57. See id. § 31.09, at 115-16. See infra Part V. Reasonable expenses incurred in an
attempt to mitigate damages are recoverable, regardless of whether the effort is or is not
successful. Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (Linn, P.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. City of Dubuque v. Iowa Trust, 519 N.W.2d 786, 790 (Iowa 1994) (citations
omitted). It should be noted that this statement combines tort and contract damage rules.
This is because, as previously stated, courts have sometimes viewed malpractice as a tort
(negligence) action and sometimes as a breach of contract action. See supra Part II, and
Begleiter, supra note 1, at 193-207. See also Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy v. Heasley, 328
N.W.2d 524, 525 (Iowa 1983) (the general measure of damages in a legal malpractice
action is "the amount of loss actually sustained as a proximate result of the conduct of the
attorney") (quoting 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 273a (1980)). In Pete v. Henderson,
269 P.2d 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954), plaintiff, the administrator of an estate, retained the
defendant attorney to represent him in an action against him as administrator. Judgment
for $1660 was rendered against plaintiff. The administrator then employed defendant to
appeal the judgment (and paid him $150), but defendant filed the notice of appeal one day
late, resulting in the dismissal of appeal. In the administrator's action against the attorney,
the attorney was found negligent by the trial court, but the damages were limited to the
fee for the appeal. On appeal, the court held that if the administrator could prove the
original judgment would have been reversed on appeal, the attorney would be liable for
$1810-the original judgment and the appeal fee. The amount of the original judgment
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I. Lost Bequest Recovery
A. General Rule
Consistent with the general rule stated in Section III, the general
basis of recovery in legal malpractice actions in estate planning is the
value of the bequest lost by plaintiff due to the attorney's
negligence.59 The typical case of this type arises when the will is
invalidly executed. In fact, this case is so common it was used by the
drafters of the Restatement of the Law-The Law Governing
Lawyers to illustrate liability to non-clients.60 Illustration 2 to section
73 of that Restatement involves a will with a bequest to plaintiff
which is invalid because it is not signed by the requisite number of
witnesses.61 Illustration 3 is based on the same facts, except that the
correct number of witnesses are used but the plaintiff alleges the
lawyer negligently named another beneficiary rather than plaintiff.62
In both cases, assuming that the state holds lawyers subject to liability
to noncients in such situations, the Restatement holds that the
plaintiff can recover the value of the lost bequest. 63
In fact, the seminal damage case in this area is factually similar to
the illustrations used in the Restatement. In Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 4
defendant attorney was hired by the beneficiary to draft a will for the
beneficiary's grandmother. Under the will, the beneficiary was to
receive one-half of testatrix's residuary estate. The will was held
invalid because the beneficiary was a necessary witness.65 In an action
by the beneficiary against the drafting attorney, the court held that
plaintiff could recover the amount of his loss, one-half of the net
residuary estate.66
In a similar, but more recent, case of a will invalid because only
one person witnessed the signing, the beneficiary of a $25,000 bequest
under the invalid will recovered the amount of his lost bequest.67 In
the course of eliminating the requirement of privity, the Wisconsin
constitutes damages proximately caused by the attorney's negligence. See id. at 79. See
also McClung v. Smith, 870 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1994).
59. See supra Part III.
60. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. f, & Illus. 2 & 3
(Tent. Draft No. 8,1997).
61. See id., Illus. 2.
62. See id., Illus. 3.
63. Id.
64. 288 P. 265 (Wash. 1930).
65. At that time, witnesses were not allowed to have an interest under the will they
witnessed. See T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 312-14 (2d ed. 1953).
This rule is changing in many states. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-505 (1990).
66. See Schirmer, 288 P. at 268 (Wash. 1930).
67. See Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983).
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Supreme Court reversed a trial court decision for the attorney and
directed the trial court to enter a verdict for the beneficiary in the
amount of his bequest under the invalid will.68
In the estate tax area, the same rule prevails with two differences.
It is the executor (on behalf of the estate) who brings the action and
recovers against the attorney, and the recovery is in the amount of
additional tax caused by the attorney's malpractice, including interest
and penalties. Illustrative is Cameron v. Montgomery.69 The attorney
filed the tax return four months and two days late. One of the
executors urged the attorney to prepare the return in a timely
manner, but the attorney claimed the IRS would do nothing about a
late filing. As a result of the late filing, the estate could not use
alternate valuation.70 This caused additional estate tax, interest and
penalties of $28,667.39. The executor sued the attorney and
recovered the tax, interest and penalty. The Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed.7'
The "loss of bequest" type of recovery has been used in other
estate planning situations to compensate beneficiaries. In one case,72
the attorney for the estate determined that the estate should be
distributed per stirpes73 when it should have been distributed per
capita.7 4 The court held the attorney liable for the difference between
the amount each beneficiary should have received and the amount
68. See id. at 330.
69. 225 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1975).
70. I.R.C. § 2032. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended and in effect as of the date of this Article, unless otherwise indicated. Section
2032, simplified and in brief, permits the assets of an estate to be valued on the date of
death or at a date six months after death if certain conditions are met.
71. See Cameron, 225 N.W.2d at 154. See also Estate of Remsen, 415 N.Y.S. 2d 370
(Sup. Ct. 1979); Wiggen v. Gordon, 455 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (a joint tenant had
paid attorney to file New York estate tax proceedings and pay the tax which the attorney
failed to do; joint tenant was held entitled to interest, the expense of filing the return, and
attorneys fees paid to new attorneys to file the tax proceeding and prosecute a misconduct
action against the former attorney); Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App.
1979).
72. See Wisdom v. Neal, 568 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.M. 1982).
73. Per stirpes means by stocks. The system distributes bequests (usually of a
residuary estate or in cases of intestacy) by reference to the root stock of the beneficiaries.
For example, if the residuary estate was bequeathed to "decedent's then living issue, per
stirpes" and decedent died with 3 children, all of whom predeceased him leaving living
issue who survived decedent, the estate would be divided into 3 equal shares, with the
share of each deceased child being distributed to that child's issue by representation.
74. Per capita means by head. Each individual takes in his or her own right and not as
a representative of his or her parent. For a more detailed description of per capita and per
stirpes and illustrations of each, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Critique, A Proposed
Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for Intestate Distribution Among
Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 626 (1971).
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each did receive under the improper distribution, plus interest from
the date of the erroneous distribution.75
Where a court adopts the contract (third party beneficiary)
theory of malpractice liability, the measure of damages is the
beneficiary's loss of expectancy. 76 The leading case adopting this
theory measured the damages as the amount of the bequest to a
beneficiary who was prohibited from taking under the will because
she was a subscribing witness to the will.77
A recent case interpreting this rule should be noted because it
involved a more complicated situation. In that case, defendant
attorney was hired to draft a will for the beneficiary's father leaving
all testator's land to the beneficiary.78 This was the father's intent.
The will as drafted did leave all the real estate to the son except for a
life estate to testator's second wife in "our homestead located at
Piscataqua Road, Dover, New Hampshire. '79 A construction action
was instituted on whether this referred to only the house or all
property on that road, which included 100 acres of land and buildings
used in the family business. The second wife, arguing for the latter
construction, was successful. Two years later, the son purchased the
widow's life estate for $400,000, then sued the attorney. The court
held the measure of damages was "the date of death fair market value
of a life estate in the real property other than the house (and,
perhaps, limited surrounding acreage)." 80
Some courts may broaden the rule. One older case stated "the
measure of damages is the difference in the pecuniary position of the
client from what it should have been had the attorney acted without
negligence."'81 The case involved an action by removed executors
against their attorney for bad legal advice and poor preparation of the
executor's account. The court awarded damages for loss of executors'
commissions ($10,000), the costs of the removal proceeding which
were paid personally by the executors ($1,904.79), interest, and the
75. See Wisdom, 568 F. Supp. 4 at 8.
76. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744,752 (Pa. 1983).
77. See id. On the rule prohibiting a subscribing witness to a will from receiving a
bequest under that will, see supra note 65.
78. See Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318 (N.H. 1994).
79. l. at 320.
80. Id. at 327. It is interesting that the court chose not to use the purchase price of the
widow's life estate as the measure of damages. The court also held the appraisal values
contained in the probate inventory were admissible as evidence of the value of the fees
and then used a table to determine the value of the life estate. The court held the trial
court could take judicial notice of the tables in the Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-7(d)(6) (1994). Plaintiff was permitted to testify as to the amount he paid for the
life estate.
81. Flynn v. Judge, 133 N.Y.S. 794,796 (App. Div. 1912).
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return of counsel fees.82 The court interpreted the loss of bequest
rule as requiring the plaintiff to be made whole.83 Though this
interpretation has not been seen in recent cases, the right
circumstances could lead a court to broaden the measure of damages
in order to make the plaintiff whole.
Lastly, it should be noted that the estate of the testator (as
opposed to the "disappointed beneficiary"), clearly may recover from
the attorney for legal malpractice in will drafting, even in states
requiring privity or having limited exceptions to privity.84 However,
the damages recoverable consist only of the attorney's fees paid for
the will drafting or estate planning, plus the costs and fees incurred in
defending the estate against liability in an action by the disappointed
beneficiary caused by the lawyer's negligence. 85 The estate cannot
recover the bequest "lost" by a beneficiary because the estate consists
of the same amount regardless of who receives it. Therefore, the
estate suffers no injury for such malpractice by the attorney.86
B. Reduction in Damages
Several factors can result in alterations of the loss of bequest
rule. One is if the plaintiff does not actually lose the bequest. A
simplified illustration involves an attorney's advice to his clients to
accept a settlement and not challenge a will.87 Eventually, the clients
received the full value of their rights. However, litigation was
necessary to achieve this result and the attorney had erroneously
advised them to accept a settlement.88 The court awarded the clients
the costs of the litigation (mainly attorneys fees) to validate their
rights.89
Similarly, if what would normally be damages is excused, such
damages are not recoverable. For example, if the IRS waives or
excuses tax penalties, the amount of such penalties are not
recoverable as malpractice damages.90  Additionally, amounts
recovered in a settlement or in some other manner involving the same
matter reduce the malpractice damages.91 For example, the amount
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. This is because the estate represents the testator's interest and is thus in privity
with him.
85. See Espinosa v. Sparber, 586 So. 2d 1221,1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
86. See id. at 1224.
87. See Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972).
88. See id at 244-45.
89. See id.
90. See Estate of Remsen, 415 N.Y.S.2d 370,371 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
91. See McLane v. Russell, 546 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. 1989). In that case, testatrix left a will
leaving a farm to plaintiff for life, with the remainder to plaintiff's son. However, the farm
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of damages for a bequest under an invalid will is reduced by the
amount received by that beneficiary as an heir in intestacy.92 Another
illustration is a case where an attorney, in changing a will, omitted the
residuary clause from the former will.93 Under the omitted residuary
clause, the two plaintiffs were equal beneficiaries. However, one of
the plaintiffs was also an heir and received $3,296.35 as an heir.94 The
court held that the damages consisted of the value of the residuary
estate after deducting administration expenses and the amount the
plaintiff received as an heir.95 Lastly, of course, there can be no
recovery if plaintiff in the malpractice action is successful in the
underlying action on which the malpractice action is based.96
was held in joint tenancy with testatrix's sister who survived her. Thus, the bequest was
not fulfilled. The plaintiff sued the drafting attorney for negligence in failing to sever the
joint tenancy so that testatrix's plan could at least have been partially effectuated. At trial,
the jury awarded plaintiff damages for one-half of the value of the farm ($325,000). The
trial court reduced the award by one-half of the amount plaintiff received from a
settlement of his suit with the estate of the other joint tenant. On appeal, the award and
the reduction on account of the settlement were affirmed.
92. See Arnold v. Charmichael, 524 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The
allowance of a recovery in this case is contrary to the Florida rule allowing malpractice
recovery only when the error is evident on the face of the will. See Begleiter, supra note 1,
at 198-204. The court does not explain its deviation from the Florida rule.
93. See Arnold, 524 So. 2d at 465. The residuary clause was not intended to be
changed.
94. See id. at 467.
95. See id. The court computed the damages as follows:
Residuary Estate $80,173.11
Less: Administration expenses
(payments to attorneys,
accountant, hospital and
personal representative) - 20835.00
$59,338.11
Less: Amount received as heir by one
of plaintiffs
Damages $56,041.76
Id.
96. See, e.g., Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379, 382 (App. Div. 1992). Plaintiff
was a compulsive gambler. He lost in an action by the IRS for failure to pay tax on his
winnings in Tax Court. He then sued his attorney for malpractice. The Tax Court
decision was reversed by the Third Circuit. In the malpractice case, the court held for the
attorney, stating that there can be no malpractice damages if the client wins the underlying
case. Plaintiff claimed damages for business ventures that failed because his credit sources
dried up. The court held this was speculative. The Third Circuit opinion reversing the
Tax Court, Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), achieved a certain
notoriety in its own right and is discussed in many Federal Income Tax casebooks.
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C. Damages for Mental or Emotional Distress
A rather surprising number of cases have considered whether in
a malpractice case a plaintiff can recover for mental or emotional
distress. In general, courts have refused recovery for mental or
emotional distress unless plaintiff has suffered physical injury.97 Since
there is rarely a physical injury in estate planning cases, it would
appear that plaintiff would have a difficult time recovering on this
basis. The usual allegation for such recovery is for emotional distress
in paying taxes98 or suffered from family disputes.99 It is uncertain
whether such allegations are made in anticipation of a jury trial or for
some other reason, but they are rarely successful.
IV. Costs To Repair Damages
Instead of engaging in litigation with other beneficiaries over the
uncertainty or mistake in the will, some executors or beneficiaries
take action to correct the error and then sue the drafting attorney for
malpractice. To date, this type of case has been confined to errors
involving estate tax planning.1°°
97. See Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 311 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1984);
Rutkoski v. Hollis, 600 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Boatright v. Derr, 919 P.2d 221
(Colo. 1996). But see Camenisch v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1689 (1996)
(damages for serious mental suffering may be recoverable without physical injury but are
not available in attorney malpractice cases; issue not decided because raised for first time
on appeal); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1996).
98. See Camenisch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1692-93. The client hired the attorney to
prepare an irrevocable life insurance trust so the insurance proceeds would not be
included in his estate. Later, because the client's other attorneys said the trust was not
created correctly, he transferred ownership of the policies to his daughters. The client
spent $11,800 to correct his trust and would have to pay $25,000 in gift tax. If he died
within 3 years of the gift, his estate would owe $525,000 in estate taxes. The client sued for
at least $1,000,000 in emotional distress. See id at 452. The court held that emotional
distress damages are not allowed in malpractice cases, whether the malpractice occurs in
litigation or in advice and drafting.
99. See Mieras, 550 N.W.2d at 206. The plaintiff alleged the attorney had a duty to
protect the testator from undue influence. Plaintiff alleged the attorney drafted the will
on the instructions of the beneficiaries and gave it to the beneficiaries who were to have it
executed. The will was executed one day after testator underwent surgery. The will
disinherited testator's daughter. The complaint requested recovery of the share the
daughter received when she challenged the will, the legal fees incurred in defending the
will, and emotional distress suffered as a result of the daughter's challenge. The Court
held the attorney was under no obligation to protect the beneficiaries from an undue
influence claim. The emotional distress alleged from the challenge to the will resulted
from the plaintiffs desire to retain their preferred position under the will, for which they
cannot recover. See id.
100. This probably results from the fact that such errors are fixable in the sense that, by
the use of disclaimers and the payment of gift taxes, the correct tax result can usually be
achieved. See infra notes 101-115: In order to correct a non-tax error, a construction or
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One of the earliest cases well illustrates the problem. The case
involved a rather typical pre-1976 estate plan.10' Barbara Bucquet's
father (the grantor) created a revocable inter vivos trust.102 On the
grantor's death, the trust was divided into equal shares. One half of
the trust (the marital share) qualified for the marital deduction. The
other half (the nonmarital share) provided that the net income was
payable to the grantor during his life and to his wife if she survived
him, which she did. On his wife's death, the income was payable to
Barbara for life. On her death, $175,000 was to be paid to Barbara's
husband and the remainder to Barbara's children.10 3 However, the
reformation proceeding would have to be commenced. The malpractice would then
consist of drafting the document in a way that did not reflect testator's intent or was
unclear. If the reformation or construction action was successful, the attorney could
probably defend the malpractice action on the ground that the beneficiaries achieved the
result they desired, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text, although the costs of the
action could be recovered. If the underlying action was unsuccessful, the attorney could
defend based on lack of negligence.
The increasing recognition of reformation actions to conform wills to testator's intent
could ease the way to non-tax cases using a "cost to fix" damages rule. Discussion of the
recent recognition of reformation in estate planning situations is beyond the scope of this
article. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE (UPC) § 2-503; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1) (1995) (to be
renumbered as § 14.1, Tentative Draft No. 2 (1998) xxviii); see also John H. Langbein &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of
Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
101. Before 1976, the estate tax marital deduction was allowed only to the extent of
fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1975). For decedents dying
after December 31, 1976 and before January 1, 1982, the marital deduction varied
depending on the size of the estate. See I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1981). For decedents dying after
December 31, 1981, the marital deduction is unlimited. See I.R.C. § 2056(a). However,
the same basic plan is used today for many spousal plans. See infra note 103.
102. See Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514,516 (Ct. App. 1976).
103. See id. The testator's clear intention, as stated by the court, was that at testator's
death, one-half of the trust corpus would qualify for the marital deduction and the other
half would be available for his wife during her life but would not be includable in her
estate or subject to estate taxes in her estate.
Most of the readers of this article are sufficiently familiar with estate planning to
understand the purpose of the dispositive format of the grantor in the case and to
recognize that the same plan, with a small variation, is still the basic estate plan for most
couples today. However, perhaps a brief explanation of the reason such a plan is
necessary is in order.
The federal estate tax is a tax on the transfer of property by reason of a person's
death. See Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2 (1958). A person's estate consists of the property that
person owns at the time of his death, plus certain other property (e.g., property held in
joint tenancy, life insurance where incidents of ownership are retained by the decedent)
and certain transfers where rights or interests are retained by the decedent (e.g., revocable
trusts). See I.R.C. §§ 2031-2045 (1999). Tax is assessed on the taxable estate, which is the
gross estate less certain deductions. See id. § 2051. The deductions include amounts paid
for administration expenses, debts, the charitable deduction, the marital deduction and the
recently-enacted deduction for family owned businesses. See id. §§ 2053-2057. After the
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tax is computed by applying the rate table in I.R.C. § 2001(c) to the taxable estate plus
adjusted taxable gifts (which are not relevant here, see I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1)(B), 2001(b)(2))
some credits are used to reduce the tax dollar for dollar. Relevant to our purposes is the
applicable credit amount under I.RC. § 2010(a). The amount of the credit is the amount
of tax on an estate of the applicable exclusion amount. See id. § 2010(c). The applicable
credit amount is really a floor. Estates below this floor pay no estate tax. For estates
above the floor, the tax on the floor is subtracted from the estate tax on the taxable estate.
For 2000, the applicable exclusion amount is $675,000 (meaning that estates of persons
dying with estates under this amount pay no tax). (The applicable exclusion amount
increases in stages until reaching $1,000,000 in 2006). The simplified computation of estate
tax for most decedents can be summarized as:
Gross estate
- Deductions
Taxable estate
X Tax Rate
Tentative Estate Tax
- Applicable Credit Amount
Estate Tax Due.
However, since a credit only reduces the tax, and since the applicable credit amount
cannot reduce the tax below zero (I.R.C. § 2010(d)), in order to use the credit, the estate
must generate a tax. Put otherwise, if an estate has deductions equal to the gross estate, it
will generate no estate tax and will not use the I.R.C. § 2010 credit.
The usual way an estate could generate deductions equal to the gross estate would be
to leave all the decedent's property to his or her surviving spouse. Since the marital
deduction, as a deduction from the gross estate, is applied before the credit in the formula
given above, bequeathing all a decedent's property to the surviving spouse results in a
taxable estate of zero, no tentative tax and no credit. For example, if decedent had a gross
estate of $2,000,000 and bequeathed it all to his spouse, his tax computation would be as
follows:
Gross Estate $2,000,000
- Marital Deduction Z000,000
Taxable estate 0
Tentative Tax 0
- Applicable Credit Amount 0
Tax Due 0
So far, the lack of use of the credit has no adverse tax consequences for the couple.
However, two other facts must be added. First, property for which a marital deduction is
given, if not consumed, will be included in the surviving spouse's estate. See id. §§ 2033,
2044, 2041. Therefore, in our example above, the surviving spouse, unless she spent her
spouse's $2,000,000, would have to include that amount in her estate when she died, in
addition to her other property. And estate tax would be generated in the surviving
spouse's estate. To illustrate, suppose the surviving spouse had no other property, and
had retained the entire $2,000,000 received from her husband, and the property had not
appreciated or depreciated. The surviving spouse's estate tax would be (ignoring debts
and administration expenses):
Gross Estate $2,000,000
Deductions 0
Taxable estate 2,000,000
Tax 780,800
Less: Applicable Credit Amount 220,550
Tax Due $560,250
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trust included a provision giving the grantor's spouse a power to
revoke the trust.1°4 This power (which was a general power of
appointment in the surviving spouse) would make the non-marital
share of the trust includable in the wife's estate under I.R.C. § 2041
and completely defeat the estate plan.10 5
After discovering the consequences of the power to revoke, the
surviving spouse disclaimed the power to revoke and assigned her life
income interest in the nonmarital share in an attempt to avoid the
One might say the surviving spouse ought to spend the inheritance. However, the
second fact we must add is that property need not be given to the spouse outright to
qualify for the marital deduction. In fact, the two most popular forms of the marital
deduction (the life estate plus general power of appointment trust under I.R.C. §
2056(b)(5) and the QTIP trust under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)) do not envision the spouse being
able to dispose of the property during lifetime.
Thus, the problem in not using the applicable credit in the estate of the first spouse to
die is an increase in tax on the estate of the surviving spouse.
For comparison purposes, if our hypothetical testator above had not given all his
property to his surviving spouse, but had given enough property to use the applicable
credit amount in a form that did not qualify for the marital deduction (for example,
leaving it in a trust with only income to his spouse and on her death to his issue, and his
executor had not elected QTIP treatment (see id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III)), the estate tax
on the couple would be:
Husband's Estate
Gross Estate $2,000,000
Marital Deduction 1,325,000
Taxable Estate 675,000
Tentative Tax 220,550
Applicable Credit Amount 220,550
Tax Due 0
Wife's Estate
Gross Estate $1,325,000
Deductions 0
Taxable Estate 1,325,000
Tentative Tax 480,550
Applicable Credit Amount 220,550
Tax Due 260,000
This would be a savings of $300,250 over a plan of bequeathing all the property to the
spouse.
It should be noted that the situation in Bucquet v. Livingston is slightly different in
that before 1976 there was no applicable credit amount and the marital deduction was
limited to fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate. However, the plan was the same
because it saved no taxes to give more than fifty percent of the estate in a marital
deduction form and, since everything bequeathed to the surviving spouse was included in
the surviving spouse's estate, additional taxes were due when the surviving spouse died.
Thus, the pre-1976 plan was designed to not overfund the marital deduction. The same
plan applies today.
104. See Bucquet, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
105. See ic at 919.
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inclusion of the nonmarital share in her estate for federal estate and
California inheritance tax purposes. Her actions were successful. 1°6
To avoid estate taxes, the surviving spouse had to pay
approximately $50,000 in federal and state gift taxes and attorneys
fees of $3,750 for the assignment.1i 7 After her death, her estate sued
the attorney who drafted the husband's lifetime trust for malpractice.
The court held the attorney liable for malpractice, because the
marital deduction trust "is one of the best known estate planning
devices.... The potential consequences of the retention of general
power of appointment are a matter within the reasonable competence
of an attorney."'1 8 The court held, if proven, that the amount the
shares of the trust payable to the other beneficiaries was diminished
by the payment of state and federal taxes caused by the erroneous tax
advice and drafting would be recoverable. °9
Another significant case using the "cost to fix" measure of
damages is Linck v. Barokas & Martin."0 Linck's entire estate,
valued at $3,000,000, was bequeathed to his widow. The widow sued
the testator's attorneys for failing to advise her to disclaim part of the
bequest to avoid overfunding the marital deduction.'' The widow
later made gifts to her children and paid gift taxes.112 The court held
that the complaint would be upheld despite the contention that no
present damage was caused. The court stated that the widow alleged
damages of the amount of gift tax paid, of attorneys" 3 and
accountant's fees incurred in connection with the gifts, of the reduced
amounts to be received by her children,"14 and of the loss of the use of
the funds until the widow's death which would have been disclaimed
and passed to the children." 5
Although the two cases discussed in this section were decided on
the pleadings, the principle of the cases clearly indicates that the
courts considered the damages to be the costs to correct the damage
106. See id.
107. See id. at 918-20.
108. Id. at 922.
109. See id. at 923.
110. 667 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1983).
111. See id. at 172-73. On overfunding the marital deduction, see supra note 103.
112. See iL
113. On whether attorneys fees can be recovered as damages, see infra Part VII.
114. The amount to the children would be reduced because of the inclusion of the
amounts not disclaimed or given to the children in the widow's estate and the payment of
a second estate tax on this amount. Decedent died in 1978, when (simplified) the
maximum allowable marital deduction was fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate. See
supra note 101.
115. See Linck, 667 P.2d at 173-74. Note that the case was decided on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court technically, of course, did not determine the
damages since the trial had not yet occurred.
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caused by the malpractice. In addition, several cases have awarded
fees and costs incurred in attempts to recover estate or inheritance
taxes paid as a result of the attorney's malpractice in preparing or
filing late the tax returns. 16 These results support the conclusion that
in certain types of cases, primarily those involving estate planning
errors, the "cost to repair" the damage done by the attorney's error,
in addition to any loss sustained by the beneficiaries, is the proper
measure of damages.
V. Reconciling the Two Theories of Damages
From the preceding discussion," 7 it would appear that different
measures of damages apply depending on whether the beneficiaries
choose to take action to repair the defect caused by the attorney's
actions. On further reflection, however, both measures reflect the
loss to the beneficiaries. This is obvious in the "loss of bequest"
measure. However, the "costs to repair" measure reflects the
expenses required to undo the damage caused by the attorney's
actions-gift taxes, additional attorneys fees and other costs.118 It is,
in a very real sense, the costs of making the situation as it should have
been if the attorney had performed competently. It is as much a
measure of the beneficiaries' loss as is the "loss of bequest" measure.
Thus, the two measures are not in reality different-they represent
the difference caused by a choice of the beneficiaries. The
significance for our purposes is that the recognition by the courts of
the different measures of damages reflects the underlying recognition
that the beneficiaries should and do have the choice of taking action
to "correct the error" and that the beneficiaries should not be
penalized for either choosing to fix the plan or not to fix the plan. If
the beneficiaries choose to act-by gifts, tax payments or otherwise-
to correct the error, they recover the costs of the correction. If
correction of the error is not feasible or is simply not the course
chosen by the beneficiaries, they recover the loss of the bequest. The
choice belongs to the beneficiaries-and rightly so, because as
between the beneficiaries and the attorney, the beneficiaries, as the
innocent parties, should have the choice.
116. See Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47,51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Estate of Hartz v.
Nelson, 437 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). See also Wilson v. Cherry, 612
N.E.2d 953, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (awarding fees paid by the estate to two attorneys and
an appraiser for tax work necessitated by the defendant attorney's negligence on a matter
involving special use valuation. I.R.C. § 2032A).
117. See supra Part IV and V.
118. See supra Part V.
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VI. Recovery of Attorney Fees As Damages
A number of cases have raised the question of whether attorney
fees can be recovered as damages in legal malpractice cases. This
problem has arisen because of the so-called "American Rule" on
attorney fees.119 The "American Rule" states that in a tort action the
winning party cannot require the losing party to pay its attorney
fees.120 The rule on attorney fees can be stated rather simply. A
successful plaintiff cannot recover from the negligent attorney the
legal fees incurred by plaintiff in bringing the malpractice action.'
2
'
However, if the attorney's negligence has required the plaintiff to
employ other attorneys to correct the errors, the fees paid to the
other attorneys are recoverable as damages because they are
reasonably foreseeable consequences of defendant attorney's
negligence.'22 In short, damages will include the fees paid to other
attorneys to cure, attempt to cure (even if unsuccessful) or mitigate
the damage caused by the attorney's negligence.123 The only fees not
recoverable are the attorney fees incurred in the malpractice
litigation itself. 24
Perhaps the clearest and most extensive discussion of this
distinction was by the Illinois Appellate Court in Sorenson v. Fio
Rito.' s Sorenson employed Fio Rito to probate her husband's will
and do the tax work.126 Fio Rito did no work for two years after
decedent's death and did not prepare or file the federal estate or
Illinois inheritance tax returns. About two and a quarter years after
her husband died, Sorenson retained a new attorney to handle her
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914(1) cmt. a (1979). The rule in
England is the opposite. See id.
120. The Restatement of Torts phrases it as follows:
The damages in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensation for attorney
fees or other expenses of the litigation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)TORTS § 914(1).
121. See In re Estate of Saxton, 686 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (Sur. Ct., Broome Co. 1998);
Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 593 A.2d 382, 389 (NJ. 1991); Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d
1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 829 (N.D. 1988); Sorenson,
413 N.E.2d at 51. But see Saffer v. Willoughby, 670 A.2d 527,534-35 (N.J. 1996).
122. See Estate of Hartz v. Nelson, 437 N.W.2d 749, 754-55 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
Girardi v. Gabriel, 649 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Mass. 1995); Olson, 421 N.W.2d at 829;
Stevenson, 158 F.3d at 1333; Lovett, 593 A.2d at 389; Wilson v. Cherry, 612 N.E.2d 953,
960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239,244-45
(La. 1972); Sorenson, 413 N.E.2d at 51-52.
123. See supra note 122.
124. See supra note 121.
125. 413 N.E.2d at 47.
126. See id at 49. Fio Rito contended that Sorenson employed another attorney in his
office (an "office associate") to do the tax work. See id. at 50. However, the trial court
ruled against Fio Rito on this contention and the Appellate Court affirmed. See id. at 51.
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husband's estate. The new attorney filed the tax returns. Because of
the late filing, $6,409.25 in penalties and interest were paid.127 In
addition, Sorenson paid $1500 in attorney fees in unsuccessful
attempts to obtain refunds of the penalties and interest.128
Fio Rito, the attorney, contended that awarding the $1500
attorney fees as damages violated the "American Rule." The court
noted that the general rule of damages charges one who commits an
illegal or wrongful act with all the natural and ordinary consequences
of the act.129 This would logically include attorney fees incurred in
suing the wrongdoer.130 However, the "American Rule" was adopted
as an exception to the normal damage rule because allowing attorney
fees might deter persons from bringing or defending uncertain
claims.131 The court then went on to distinguish the attorney fees
involved in seeking a refund of the penalties and interest from the
litigation expenses for which recovery is prohibited by the "American
Rule":
It is clear from this statement that the policy against awarding
attorneys' fees was intended to apply only where a successful
litigant seeks to recover his costs in maintaining the lawsuit. We do
not believe it was intended to preclude a plaintiff from recovering
losses directly caused by the defendant's conduct simply because
those losses happen to take the form of attorneys' fees. The
plaintiff here is not attempting to recover the attorneys' fees she
expended in bringing this lawsuit. Rather, she seeks to recover
losses incurred in trying to obtain refunds of tax penalties which
were assessed against her solely as a result of the defendant's
negligence. Had the plaintiff been forced to hire an accountant to
repair the damage caused by the defendant's conduct, she would
undoubtedly have been entitled to recover the accountant's fee as
an ordinary element of damages. There is no basis in logic for
denying recovery of the same type of loss merely because the
plaintiff required an attorney instead of an accountant to correct
the situation caused by the defendant's neglect. In holding the
defendant liable for the plaintiff's losses, we are not violating the
policy against "penalizing" a litigant for defending a lawsuit. We
are simply following the general rule of requiring a wrongdoer to
127. See id. at 50.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 51.
130. See id.
131. See id. The Sorenson court quoted Flieschman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co.:
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions
to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents' counsel.
386 U.S. 714,718, (1967).
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bear the consequences of his misconduct.
The distinction between legal expenses which are recoverable as
ordinary damages and attorneys' fees which are not recoverable as
costs of litigation .... 132
Other courts have also recognized the distinction between
litigation expenses in the malpractice action, which are not
recoverable, and other foreseeable attorney fees caused by the
wrongdoing of the attorney, which are elements of damage
recoverable in the malpractice action.1
33
VII. Speculative Damages
A. The Rule
An attorney accused of malpractice is not responsible for
speculative damages. 134 Otherwise put, if the only damages which can
be alleged by plaintiff are speculative, the judgment will be in favor of
the defendant attorney, since the existence of damages is an essential
element of the cause of action.135 The test is not the difficulty in
ascertaining or calculating the damages, but rather whether any actual
damages have happened. 136 Thus, speculative damages arise when
there is doubt of whether damage has occurred, as opposed to
certainty of damage but uncertainty as to the amount or the method
of ascertaining the amount.137 For example, although a claim for lost
profits in a tort action is usually speculative,138 if an injury has
occurred it is proper to award damages for future pecuniary losses.139
132. Sorenson, 413 N.E.2d at 51-52. In distinguishing two prior cases, the court further
remarked:
In both of those cases, the indemnity plaintiff [the party suing the attorney] was
properly subject to suit by the injured party. The indemnity defendant [the
attorney] did nothing to subject the plaintiff to avoidable litigation and was
therefore not required to pay the resulting attorney's fees. Here, on the other
hand, the defendant's neglect was the direct cause of the legal expenses incurred
by the plaintiff. Had the defendant properly filed the necessary tax returns, there
would have been no need for the plaintiff to engage in efforts to recover penalty
and interest charges.
IL at 53.
133. See, e.g., Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 593 A.2d 382, 389 (N.J. 1991); Stevenson v.
Severs, 158 F.3d 1332,1333 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
134. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 19.3, at 599.
135. See Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Pa. 1998); Giambrone v. Bank of
New York, 677 N.Y.S. 2d 608,609 (App. Div. 1998).
136. See 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 54, § 19.3, at 599-600.
137. See id. at 599-601.
138. See id. at 601.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 913A (1979). The amount awarded is
reduced to the present value. See id., cmt. a.
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B. Estate Planning: The Problem Cases
A problem may arise in legal malpractice cases involving estate
planning because the damage may be labeled as speculative. Two
types of cases (one of which has arisen) may illustrate this problem.
(1) The Marital Deduction Case
One problem case is the marital deduction-credit shelter will 140
where the drafter erroneously gives the surviving spouse a lifetime
power of withdrawal or a general testamentary power of
appointment. 141 If the surviving spouse has a lifetime power of
withdrawal, damages may be speculative for at least three reasons.
First, it is unknown whether the surviving spouse will exercise the
power and to what extent the value of the trust will be includable in
his gross estate. Second, even if the surviving spouse exercises the
power, he may spend or otherwise dispose of the assets gained from
the trust, with the result that these assets will not be included in the
surviving spouse's gross estate. Third, the value of the trust, together
with the surviving spouse's assets, may be under the threshold for the
imposition of an estate tax.142 This final reason can make the
damages speculative for both lifetime and testamentary powers.
(2) The Rule Against Perpetuities Case
The common law rule against perpetuities voided any contingent
remainder or executory interest which vested later than the
termination of lives in being at the creation of the interest plus 21
140. For a discussion of this problem see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
141. Either of these powers will result in inclusion of the property in the surviving
spouse's gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2041. This error occurred in Bucquet v. Livingston, 57
Cal. App. 3d 914 (1976). In that case, the surviving spouse made gifts and paid gift taxes
so that damages became certain during her lifetime and the problem discussed here did
not occur. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. A similar situation could
occur when the will gives the entire estate to a marital deduction trust, particularly a QTIP
trust (see I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)), thus overfunding the marital deduction and giving the
surviving spouse no way to solve the problem except to either disclaim the exemption
equivalent portion of the trust or, if the I.R.C. § 2518 disclaimer time limit has expired, to
make a gift of his life income interest. Again, the damage would not be determinable until
the death of the surviving spouse. This was the situation in Linck v. Barokas & Martin,
667 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1983), but again the surviving spouse made gifts to her children on
which she paid gift taxes, thus rendering the damages certain at an earlier time. See supra
notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
142. The applicable credit amount for 2000 is the amount of tentative tax on $675,000($220,550). See I.R.C. § 2010. This means that if the taxable estate plus adjusted taxable
gifts is less than $675,000 (and the decedent has not used any of the applicable credit
amount during lifetime), no estate tax is payable. See I.R.C. § 2001. The "exemption
equivalent" of the applicable credit amount is scheduled to increase in stages to $1,000,000
for decedents dying in 2006 and thereafter. See I.R.C. § 2010(c).
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years.143 Any interest which violated the rule was void ab initio,
which meant that the damage occurred when the will or trust
containing the provision became effective rather than when a court
declared the violation. 144
However, under the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities ("USRAP"), 145 that rule is changed for interests which
may violate the rule. For such interests, no finding of invalidity is
made until it is determined whether the interest either vests or
terminates within 90 years after the interest is created. 46 Therefore,
no nonvested interest will be invalidated prior to 90 years after its
creation. In a case where an interest might violate the rule against
perpetuities in a USRAP state, no violation (and therefore no
damage) will occur prior to 90 years after the creation of the interest.
Any malpractice action brought against the drafting attorney prior to
that time will be dismissed because damage will be speculative. 47
C. Estate Planning: The Decided Cases
In general, the cases so far decided in the estate planning area
have confirmed the general rule that actual damages are required for
attorney liability.148 Perhaps the most extended discussion occurred
in a recent Ohio case.149 The case involved an amendment to a
revocable inter vivos trust executed by a terminally ill decedent. The
effect of the amendment, which was drafted in response to a question
from the grantor to his attorney as to whether any changes were
needed in the trust because of the change in the estate tax marital
deduction rules in 1981, was to put grantor's entire estate into a
marital trust. 50 This overfunded the marital trust by failing to use the
143. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638,639 (1938).
144. See id. at 642-43. It is beyond the scope of this Article to go any further into the
complexities of the rule against perpetuities. For a list of some recent articles dealing with
the rule, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1992). See also Ira Mark Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement:
There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987). For malpractice cases involving the
rule, see Begleiter, supra note 1, at 195-96, 230-31, 256-59.
145. 8B ULA 321 (1993) (hereinafter USRAP). USRAP has been adopted by 25
states. See 8B ULA 57 (Supp. 1999).
146. See USRAP § 1(a)(2); cmt. c. The statement in the text is somewhat simplified.
Some interests may be reformed if a nonvested interest can vest but not before the
expiration of the 90 year period. See id. § 3(3).
147. It probably does not need to be stated that the attorney is unlikely to be alive (or
at least still practicing) at the time it is determined that a violation does occur. If the
attorney has died and his estate has been closed, what course of action is left for the
beneficiaries whose interests have been invalidated?
148. See supra Part VIII.A.
149. See Pietz v. Toledo Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
150. See id.
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grantor's applicable credit amount.151 When the error was discovered
the widow and the son, who were the trust beneficiaries, sued for
malpractice for failure to utilize the applicable credit amount. They
requested compensatory damages, including the son's lost inheritance
and tax disadvantages, and punitive damages.152 The trial court held
that the widow suffered no damages.153 Decedent's children appealed
on the ground that the credit shelter trust created under the will, of
which they were beneficiaries, was not funded due to the error. The
court held the damages to the children were speculative. After
repeating the general rules that "damage must be shown with
certainty and not be left to conjecture and speculation"' 54 and "[I]t is
uncertainty as to the existence of damages, not uncertainty as to the
amount, which precludes recovery"'155 the court noted that the credit
shelter trust directed that the net income and as much of the corpus
as the trustee deemed necessary for the comfort, care and support of
the widow was to be paid to her. Under this provision, the court
reasoned that the trustee could have distributed all the income and
corpus from this trust to the widow, leaving nothing for the
children. 5 6 Therefore, the amount the children might ultimately
receive could not be ascertained at the time of the case. Moreover,
the tax advantages depended on the size of the widow's estate at her
death and the tax laws at that time. 57 These factors rendered any
damage to the children speculative. 58
In a case where attorneys drafted a trust which was not executed
prior to decedent's death, the court ruled that any damages based on
an unexecuted document (a single life trust, under which plaintiffs
income interest was at the sole discretion of the trustees) were
speculative.159 A similar result occurred where, because of an error in
witnessing the will, the estate passed to the beneficiaries outright
rather than into a family trust.160 The widow married a person who
embezzled the estate. The beneficiaries alleged that had the will been
witnessed properly and the estate been placed in a family trust, the
151. This is the situation referred to in Part VIII.B.1, supra.
152. See 577 N.E.2d at 1121.
153. Her complaint alleged that the trust would be included in her estate and that the
inclusion would generate federal estate tax. See id. Although the court does not give the
basis of the trial court's holding that the widow suffered no damage, it is presumably
because the widow was alive at the time of the case and had not paid estate tax on her
estate. See id.
154. Id. at 1122.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1122.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Giambrone v. Bank of New York, 677 N.Y.S.2d 608,610 (App. Div. 1998).
160. See Girardi v. Gabriel, 649 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
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estate would not have been lost. The court held that the loss of funds
was not proven to have resulted from the attorney's negligence.
161
The loss of commissions by executors due to an alleged error of their
attorney was held to be speculative, since the award of executor's
commissions is always discretionary with the court.162 One court has
held that the same rules applied where the roles of the parties were
reversed. 63 An attorney advised contingent remaindermen of a trust
that a disclaimer would not cause estate or gift tax liability. In fact, at
that time, the law on the subject was uncertain. Ultimately, the I.R.S.
asserted gift tax liability, which was paid. The attorney argued that if
plaintiffs had not disclaimed and the remainders had become
possessory, their estates would have included the value of the
remainder interest on which they paid gift taxes after disclaiming.
Thus, the attorney alleged, the remaindermen suffered no damage.
The court rejected the attorney's allegation on the ground that under
the set of facts posited by the attorneys, the plaintiffs could have
spent the money or given it away. Thus, the allegation of offsetting
taxes was speculative.164
A few cases involved circumstances under which the courts
refused to hold the damages speculative. In a case involving the
failure to establish a testator's capacity at the time of the execution of
the will, the court refused to dismiss the action and held a
determination of damages should be possible.165  The testator
executed the will while he was in the hospital during his last illness.
During his eight days in the hospital, he executed several wills. This
resulted in a will contest. Plaintiff asked for the expenses incurred in
defending the will contest, which she alleged were at least double
what they should have been. And in a case where the question of
whether the value of a life insurance trust would be included in the
client's estate would be determined within three years following the
date of the gift,166 the court refused to strike the allegation of
damages since the costs of correcting the error could become
recoverable before or during the trial. 67
161. See id. at 809.
162. See Flynn v. Judge, 133 N.Y.S. 794,797 (App. Div. 1912).
163. See Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806-07 (Mass. 1996).
164. See id.
165. See Rathblott v. Levin, 697 F. Supp. 817,818,820,821 (D.N.J. 1988).
166. See I.R.C. § 2035.
167. See Camenisch, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1689, 1699 (Ct. App. 1996). In that case, a client
hired Camenisch, an attorney, to prepare a life insurance trust with the object of having
the life insurance removed from his estate. The trust as drafted reserved a number of
powers to the grantor, although there was disagreement over whether these powers would
cause inclusion of the trust in the client's estate. Twelve years later, the client dismissed
Camenisch, transferred the insurance to his daughters, and paid some $25,000 in gift taxes.
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D. Analysis
It is difficult to argue with the cases discussed in the preceding
subsection holding the damages speculative. If a court were required
to make an outright award of damages at trial when it is uncertain
whether the plaintiff might ever suffer any damage, the attorney
would be justified in complaining profusely of injustice.
And yet, in the situations hypothesized in subsection B of this
section, it appears similarly unjust to leave the plaintiff without any
remedy. In the marital deduction situation, it is surely possible that
some tax may be generated by the inclusion of the trust in the
surviving spouse's gross estate. It is, of course, also possible, either
due to the lack of other assets or because of the repeal or alteration of
the estate tax, that no tax will be incurred because of the attorney's
error. Similarly, in the perpetuities case under USRAP, it is possible
that some beneficiaries that testator desired to benefit will receive
nothing or less than testator intended. Should there be no remedy in
these cases because the incurring of damages is postponed? In
considering this question, the oft-mentioned rule that "[t]he
'speculative nature' of the damages is no defense to a negligent
lawyer whose client has lost the opportunity to have his claim
adjudicated by a court and jury" should not be ignored.168 After all,
the attorney has erred. As between a negligent 169 party and an
innocent party, should not the innocent party be at least given
consideration? And yet, if it turns out that the beneficiaries suffer no
damage, why should the attorney be forced to pay?
For these situations, a new way of thinking is needed. A new
remedy, which balances the interests of the attorney and the
beneficiaries, and which takes into account the deferred nature of the
damage determination, is required. We now proceed to an
examination of possible remedies.
The client sued for emotional distress and other damages. The client spent approximately
$11,800 to correct the alleged errors to the trust and $25,000 in gift tax paid. If the client
died within three years of the gift, the inclusion of the life insurance in his estate would
generate approximately $525,000 in estate tax. The court ruled that the client could not
recover for emotional distress. As to the damage for potential estate taxes, the court
refused to strike the allegation. Although the damages may be speculative at the time the
motion is made, they could become recoverable if the client died before trial. See id. at
1692-93, 1696-97, 1699.
168. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 19.3, at 600 n.8 (quoting Better Homes, Inc.
v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93,96 (N.D. W.Va. 1961)).
169. Or an actor who has breached his contract, if the court views malpractice in estate
planning as a third party beneficiary contractual question. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at
204-06.
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VIH. The Potential Remedies
A. The Statute of Limitations
The last section discussed the inequity in the "speculative
damages" rule, prohibiting recovery in legal malpractice cases where
the damages are uncertain.170 This section discusses two potential
arguments to overcome this problem and some analogies to other
types of damages that are routinely allowed in malpractice actions.
First, it could be argued that the cases dismissing malpractice
actions based on speculative damages do so because the action is
premature. Put another way, the cause of action for malpractice has
not yet accrued (the statute has not yet begun to run) because
damage-a necessary element for the cause of action-has not yet
occurred. 171
The majority rule is clearly that damage is a necessary element of
the cause of action for legal malpractice (whether legal malpractice is
viewed as a tort, a contract or a separate action).,72 The requirement
of damages for a negligence case leads to the rule that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until some damage has occurred.173
Moreover, nominal damage is not sufficient; actual, measurable
damages are required for a malpractice cause of action. 74 More
significant for our purpose, the threat of future harm is not sufficient
to begin the running of the statute of limitations, since no present
damage has resulted. 7 5 Lastly, whether or when damage has
occurred is a question of fact in each case. 76
Perhaps the best statement of this rule, and certainly the most
quoted, is from the case credited with first stating the rule:
The elements of a cause of action in tort for professional negligence
are: (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and
170. See supra Part VIII.
171. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 21.11, at 776-814.
172. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 165
(5th ed. 1984).
173. See id. If this is not a universal rule, it is certainly a majority rule. One article
states that, as of 1994, 30 states and the District of Columbia required some damage to
occur for the statute of limitations to begin running in a legal malpractice action, and two
states rejected the rule, Pennsylvania was divided, seven states accrue the action at the
date of the negligent act, and the remaining states have not passed on the question. See
Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Westrich, Limitations of Legal Malpractice Actions: Defining
Actual Injury and The Problem of Simultaneous Litigation, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 26-27
(1994).
174. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 19.2, at 597.
175. See KEETON, supra note 172, at 165.
176. See Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433,437-38 (Cal. 1971).
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exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal
connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's
negligence. If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause
damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. The mere breach of
a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative
harm, or the threat of future harm-not yet realized-does not
suffice to create a cause of action for negligence. Hence, until the
client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of his attorney's
negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for
malpractice.... The cause of action arises, however, before the
client sustains all, or even the greater part, of the damages
occasioned by his attorney's negligence. Any appreciable and
actual harm flowing from the attorney's negligent conduct
establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue.... In
any event, the determination of the time when plaintiff suffered
damage raises a question of fact.177
Given the rule that damages (in the sense of the occurrence of
actual damages rather than the quantity of damage) are necessary to
start the running of the statute of limitations, what constitutes
damages for the purposes of the rule? First, whether damages have
occurred is always a question of fact and depends on the
circumstances of the case.178  The leading case on the subject
suggested, without deciding, that if the plaintiff incurred attorneys
fees, this might constitute damage sufficient to begin the running of
177. Id at 436-38, (footnotes and citations omitted). Budd has been superceded by a
statute, CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1999), which provides in part as follows:
§ 340.6 Action against attorney for wrongful act or omission, other than fraud
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for
actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be
commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful
act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission,
whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal
action exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled during the time
that any of the following exist:
(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury[.]
Recent California cases have confirmed that the statute adopted the rules stated in
Budd and only clarified that it was the fact of injury, rather than the amount of damages,
that was significant in the accrual of the cause of action. See Jordache v. Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison, 958 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Cal. 1998). This appears to be the general rule, see 2
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 21.11, at 785, although some decisions require a
certain quantity of damage, usually described as "substantial" or "appreciable," id. at 785-
86 & n.26. The question of whether the cause of action for malpractice was tolled until (or
the statute begins running before) actual damages were suffered or whether a specific
quantity of damage was required has been the subject of a great deal of litigation and is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 21.11.
178. See Budd, 491 P.2d at 437-38.
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the statute of limitations. 179 Later cases generally have agreed that
incurring of attorney fees to correct or defend the document in
question constitutes damages sufficient to begin the running of the
statute of limitations.180
This question has been considered in a considerable number of
cases. In Bormaster v. Baldridge,181 malpractice was alleged due to
the failure of the attorney to obtain the acknowledgment of the
grantor's signature on a trust amendment. The court held that the
payment by the beneficiary named in the amendment to an attorney
to represent him in litigation he thought would be filed by other
beneficiaries constituted damage sufficient to start the statute of
limitations running.' 2 Palmras v. Barcelona was a malpractice action
for negligently drafting a will which was supposed to give most of the
estate above the amount specified in a settlement agreement to the
testator's second wife rather than the children of his first marriage. 183
The complaint alleged that the children of the former marriage
brought two actions challenging the will, which the second wife was
forced to defend. The court held that the malpractice cause of action
accrued when the second wife paid attorneys to defend the will in the
actions brought by the children. The court held that injury was
synonymous with damage, which means merely that the plaintiff
suffered a loss.184 The paying of an attorney constituted damages
sufficient to cause accrual of the malpractice action. 85
The recent case of Sindell v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher was an
action by the daughters of decedent's first marriage who were
required to defend a litigation challenging an inter vivos trust created
for their benefit against the children of grantor's second wife.186 The
attorneys had failed to procure a statement from the second wife
when the trust was created, at a time when she was competent and
willing to execute it, that the property used to fund the trust was the
179. See id. at 437. The case was decided on a motion for summary judgment so the
court did not pass on the sufficiency of the legal fees as damages. In dicta, however, the
court noted that plaintiff alleged that she had incurred $1,503.38 plus additional legal fees
on a judgment of $38,450.61 in the underlying action and that these fees might suffice as
damages. See id at 437.
180. See Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, 703 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ill. Ct. App.
1998); Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205,1210 (Cal. 1995); Jordache, 958 P.2d at 1070.
181. 723 S.W.2d 533,537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
182. See id. It should be noted that the payment of the attorney fee constituted damage
even though the litigation had not yet been filed. It is interesting that the fee paid was
$500, but the liability the client expected at the time the litigation was filed was $125,000-
$150,000 and the action by the other beneficiaries was eventually settled for $75,000.
183. 672 N.E.2d 1245,1246 (1. App. Ct. 1996).
184. See id. at 1247.
185. See id.
186. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594,597 (Ct. App. 1997).
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grantor's separate property rather than community property. When
the grantor died, the court held that the children had sustained
damage by having to litigate issues which would have been
unnecessary but for the attorney's negligence in failing to procure the
statement. Therefore, although the underlying action concerning the
nature of the trust assets as separate or community property was still
pending, damage had occurred and the action was not premature.
8
The court held that although normally in cases of this type, damage
does not occur until the resolution of the underlying action because
that determines the accuracy of the attorney's work,188 this case was
not controlled by that rule because the attorney's error was not in
drafting the language of the plans, but in failing to obtain the
statement from the first wife.189 Therefore, the event was the damage.
If plaintiffs were successful in the underlying litigation, their damage
was the attorneys fees and litigation costs of the underlying litigation.
If they lost, they incurred additional damages consisting of the
portion of the trust paid to the second wife's children. 19° However, in
any event, the cause of action accrued on the date the underlying
litigation was filed.191
In summary, in the will drafting cases, the payment of attorneys
fees to investigate or defend against actions caused by the attorney's
actions will trigger the running of the statute of limitations.192
In the tax cases decided, the question generally concerns at what
stage of the proceedings damage occurs. Most of the decisions hold
that damage occurs when the IRS assesses a deficiency,193 although
some courts have held that damage can occur prior to the notice. 94
Other courts have held that damage occurs later, when court action is
187. See id. at 603.
188. There has been a good deal of argument over whether damage occurs only when
the underlying litigation is concluded (or any appeals are concluded or barred by time
limits on appeal) or at some earlier time. A discussion of this matter is beyond the scope
of this article. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 21.11 at 800-01 (Supp. 1999 at
184-85 (1999)). At the time of Sindell, it was thought that governing California law
required judgment in the underlying action in at least some circumstances to begin the
running of the statute of limitations. See IT Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Niles, 885 P.2d 965,
972 (Cal. 1994). Sindell distinguished Niles on the facts. See Sindell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
600-01. Niles was overruled in Jordache, 958 P.2d at 1079.
189. See Sindell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
190. See id. at 602.
191. See id. at 603.
192. See also Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Cal. 1995), which is not an estate
planning case, but which cites Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 417 (1979) as
holding that no actual damage for negligent preparation of trust documents arose until the
trust was challenged and plaintiffs had to raise legal fees to defend their interests.
193. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, at 797-98.
194. See id at 798.
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final or on appellate review. 95 Still other courts have found other
events crucial in determining when the statute of limitations begins to
run.
196
How does the law on the accrual of the statute of limitations
affect the speculative damage cases in estate planning? Recall our
two prototypical cases: The marital deduction-credit shelter will
where the credit shelter trust contains a general power of
appointment and the will containing a trust which violates the rule
against perpetuities. 197 In the marital deduction-credit shelter case,
no damage would occur until the death of the surviving spouse, when
the value of the credit shelter trust would be includable in the
surviving spouse's estate. 98 In the rule against perpetuities case, even
though under perpetuities law the provision violating the rule is void
immediately,199 it is arguable that no damage occurs until at least a
beneficiary must defend the will against a challenge based on the
violation of the rule against perpetuities. 2 °  If the jurisdiction
involved has enacted USRAP,201 the "wait and see" rule will clearly
postpone any damage until the trust is challenged or until the passing
of 90 years from the date of the trust's creation. Therefore, it appears
that unless the beneficiary incurs attorneys fees to investigate and/or
correct the estate tax consequences of including the power of
withdrawal or general power of appointment in the credit shelter trust
or the rule against perpetuities violation,202 there will be no damage
suffered and the malpractice statute of limitations will not start
running.
Suppose, however, that the beneficiary, fearful that the statute of
limitations for the malpractice action will expire, sues the drafting
attorney. As we have seen, the action will no doubt be dismissed
under the speculative damage rule.203 But, as a recent case makes
clear, that dismissal should be without prejudice.204 A client sued his
195. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 172, at 44-45; Bronstein v. Kalcheim &
Kalcheim, 414 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Ill. 1980).
196. See, e.g., Witte v. Goldey, 590 N.W.2d 266, 268-69 (S.D. 1999) (accountant
malpractice, damage occurred when returns were filed); Herrmann v. McMenony &
Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn. 1999) (excise tax for prohibited transaction in
pension plan, damage occurred at time of prohibited transaction). See also KEETON,
supra note 172, at 41-45.
197. See supra Part VIII.B.
198. I.R.C. § 2041 (1999).
199. See supra note 144.
200. See supra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 145-147.
202. See supra Part V.
203. See supra Part VIII.C.
204. See Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, 703 N.E.2d 473, 481 (MI1. App. Ct.
1998).
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former law firm for inaccurate advice regarding solicitation of his
former employer's clients. The former employer had sued plaintiff,
but that action was pending. The court held that plaintiff had
suffered no damages and that plaintiff's action was premature.20 5
However, the appellate court also held that the trial court should
have dismissed the claim without prejudice and that plaintiff should
be able to refile the case when the underlying litigation was
completed.206
Therefore, it appears that a plaintiff in a "speculative damage"
estate planning case is not required to sue the attorney until he either
incurs attorneys fees (either to cure the defect or to defend against
litigation brought by the other beneficiaries), or until the IRS assesses
a tax deficiency. The question remains, however, whether this rule is
the best solution to the speculative damage problem and whether it
will protect beneficiaries in all cases.
The first problem with the above analysis is that it applies only in
the absence of a statute specifically providing otherwise. In recent
years, a number of states have enacted so-called "statutes of repose,"
which typically provide that no action for legal malpractice may be
brought after a certain number of years from the occurrence of the
act, omission, or failure constituting the malpractice.20 7 The above
analysis, which concentrates on the damage element of the action,
would be inapplicable to at least some of these statutes.20 8 Therefore,
if the local jurisdiction has a statute of repose, the malpractice action
may be barred by the statute by the time the damage finally occurs.
Perhaps more significantly, there are serious disadvantages to
postponing a decision on malpractice until the death of the second
spouse or a decision on the validity of an interest under the rule
against perpetuities. One of the purposes of the statute of limitations
is to encourage the bringing of an action while the evidence is fresh.
2°9
Postponing the malpractice action for many years would make the
recollection of witnesses stale (indeed, many witnesses might die in
the interim) and could cause deterioration of evidence.210 Indeed,
205. See id. at 475.
206. See id. at 481.
207. See, e.g., Hargett v. Holland, 447 S.E.2d 784, 787 (N.C. 1994). See generally 2
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 21.8, at 750-64 and especially 751 n.2; Ochoa &
Wistrick, supra note 173, at 26-27.
208. Section 340.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure would be amenable to the
above analysis because its repose provision contains an exception tolling the statute for
the period when the plaintiff has not sustained actual damages. See Ca. Civ. Proc. Code §
340.66 (West 1999). Many of the other statutes listed in 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note
54, at 751 n.2, 175 n.2 (Supp. 1999), do not contain this exception.
209. See Ochoa & Wistrick, supra note 173, at 11.
210. See id.; 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, at 813-14.
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tolling the statute of limitations until damage results in the two
prototypical cases of speculative damages discussed in this article is
directly contrary to one of the major policies underlying the statute of
limitations. Therefore, faced with this policy, there is no guarantee
that a court would decide to postpone the accrual of the malpractice
cause of action for many years. Remembering that the question of
when a malpractice cause of action accrues is a question of fact, a
court has room to make distinctions between different factual
circumstances in deciding when a malpractice cause of action
accrues. 21' Moreover, that decision involves a process of balancing
the interests of the claimant, the attorney and the judicial system.212
There is no guarantee that in the "speculative damage" cases
discussed that balance would favor the claimant.
B. Comparable Recoveries Allowed
Before proceeding to discuss a method of solving the speculative
damages problem which does not suffer from some of the
disadvantages of postponing the accrual of (or tolling the running of)
the statute of limitations, it would be appropriate to briefly discuss
certain situations in which recovery has traditionally been allowed,
although both the amount and the basis of recovery contain
considerable uncertainty. My purpose here is not to discuss any of
these in any detail, but merely to point out the allowance of recovery
for these damages and briefly compare these damages to the
"speculative damage" situations posed previously.
(1) Trust Investment Violations
Violations by trustees of the "prudent person" or "prudent
investor" rules have always been remedied.2 13 Under the newly
formulated prudent investor rule, the damages for failure to make
proper investments, if the beneficiary does not affirm the transaction,
is the total return which would have accrued had the trust been
invested properly.21 4  This return is "based on a total return
experience for suitable investments of generally comparable
trusts.121 5  The Reporter's Notes state that "[t]his approach is
facilitated by the ready availability of relevant performance data in
the modem financial world" and can be accomplished by looking at
211. See 2 MALLEN & SMrH, supra note 54, at 813.
212. See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) §
211 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], §§ 205, 211 reporter's notes [hereinafter Reporter's
Notes](1990).
213. RESTATEMENT, supra note 212, § 211.
214. See id.
215. Id.
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the performance of comparable trusts or parts thereof, or to an index
or benchmark portfolio.216
The author has no quarrel with the Restatement's remedy or its
purpose. For the purpose of this Article, however, the assumptions
inherent in the remedy should be noted. How are the comparable
portfolios chosen? Even if the trustee had invested the trust assets in
accordance with the prudent investor rule, would the returns of the
trust have matched the returns of comparable portfolios, or some
standard index?217 Indeed, if the trustee had invested the assets
properly, the portfolio might have had the same return as it did with
the improper investments.218 The uncertainties seem to equal those in
the paradigm cases previously posed-the rule against perpetuities
violation in a USRAP state or the inclusion of a general power of
appointment in a credit shelter trust where the tax liability does not
arise until the death of the surviving spouse.
Some courts did not even wait for the Restatement to invoke
similar remedies. In First Alabama Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v.
Spragins,219 the court awarded damages against a trustee for lack of
diversification based on the testimony of an "expert in trust
management,"220 who alternated investing the assets in an index
fund221 and U.S. Treasury bills. The testimony of the expert was
based on the entire portfolio being 100% in the index fund or
treasury bills.222 More importantly, the expert's calculations were
based on changing from the index fund to the treasury bills and back
at exactly the right time.3
Would any trustee have invested as did the expert witness in
Spragins? Would a trustee have been as accurate in calling the
market turns as the expert? And, if not, aren't the damages allowed
in Spragins as speculative as the damages in our hypotheticals?
One may state that in the improper investment cases, there was
damage from the improper investment. In our hypotheticals, there
may never be damages because the trust may never violate the rule
against perpetuities -4 or the surviving spouse may have an estate not
216. Reporter's Notes, supra note 212, § 211.
217. And, indeed, which index would be chosen?
218. I want to emphasize that I do not disagree with RESTATEMENT section 211 either
in theory or in application. I simply point out the uncertainties involved in the measure of
damages for comparison with the "speculative" cases in Part VIII.
219. 515 So. 2d 962 (Ala. 1987).
220. Id. at 965.
221. An S&P 500 Index Fund. See iL at 970 (Tarbert, C.J., dissenting).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Or because no beneficiary may ever bring an action challenging the validity of the
interest.
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exceeding the unified credit.2-5 But there is only damage from
improper investment if the measure chosen for damages indicates a
loss. In both cases there is a clear breach of duty. But the damage
difference is not so clear.
(2) Unrealized Capital Gains
Perhaps even closer to our current topic are two recent cases
allowing a discount from the gift tax value of a closely held
corporation for "built-in" capital gains. A bit of background is
necessary before proceeding.
A federal gift tax is imposed on gifts.' 2 6  The value of the
property at the time of the gift is the amount of the gift.- 7 For federal
gift tax purposes, the value of the property is:
the price at which such property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.... All relevant facts and elements of
value as of the time of the gift shall be considered. 228
While the valuation of publicly traded stock is based on market
prices, no such market price is available for a closely held stock,
which is valued from a variety of factors.229 In two recent cases, the
question has arisen of whether, in the valuation of gifts of closely held
stock, account should be taken of the built-in federal income tax on
the stock which would be payable230 In both cases, the court held
that in valuing the stock, the built-in capital gains tax should be
considered even though there was no evidence indicating the owner
had any plans to sell the asset'3 1
While there are clearly differences between awarding
malpractice damages and determining the fair market value of
property for federal gift tax purposes, it is instructive that in both gift
tax cases the Internal Revenue Service argued that, because there
were no plans to sell the asset, consideration of the capital gains was
225. Or the estate tax may be completely repealed, as has been proposed recently by
the Republicans. See Tax Relief Among GOP Proposals, DES MOIRES REG., July 21,
1999, at 3.
226. See I.R.C. § 2501.
227. See I.R.C. § 2512.
228. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1992).
229. See Eisenberg v. CIR, 155 F.3d 50,53 (2d Cir. 1998), acq. 1999-4 I.R.B. 4; Rev. Rul.
59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237,238. See also the very recently decided case of Jameson v. CIR, 77
TCM (CCH) 1383 (1999).
230. See Eisenberg, 155 F. 3d at 53. Davis v. CIR, 110 T.C. 530,550 (1998).
231. See Eisenberg, 115 F. 3d at 53; Davis, 110 T.C. at 550. The courts ruled that a
hypothetical willing buyer would consider the capital gains tax in determining the value of
the stock. Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 56; Davis, 110 T.C. at 550.
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"too speculative to be considered."3 2 The IRS in Eisenberg further
argued that it was impossible to determine when the property would
be sold and thus what the tax rate would be, nor could the value of
the property at that time be determined. Therefore it would be
speculative as to whether a gain or loss would result233 3 This sounds
almost exactly like the arguments made by the courts in the estate
planning malpractice cases discussed earlier in this article holding the
damages speculative. The court in Eisenberg disagreed. The court
noted that the issue was not what the buyer planned to do with the
property, but the effect of the potential capital gains tax on the
hypothetical willing buyerP 4 It also noted that courts had previously
allowed discounts for such taxes if payment of the tax was likely. 535
Clearly, the court was convinced both that the possibility of the
imposition of income tax in the future would have influenced a willing
buyer and that a court could give it the proper weight.
(3) Administrative Discretion
One other recent case on a subject which, at first glance, is
completely unrelated to the topic at hand, also supports awarding
damages in the speculative cases. The case was a legal malpractice
case in which the alleged malpractice was in preparing the documents
required by the Comptroller of the Currency under a federal
statute.236 Because of the failure to obtain prior approval of a transfer
in ownership, when the bank became insolvent, the Comptroller
issued a notice of assessment for $595,000 against the client. As part
of a settlement, the Comptroller agreed to forego the assessment of a
civil penalty against the client but reserved the right to take future
action on the assessment if he deemed such action appropriateP 7 In
the malpractice action, the attorney claimed the damages were
speculative because the Comptroller had never taken action to collect
the assessment.238 The South Dakota statute allowed damages for
detriment "certain to result in the future." -39  Interpreting the
purpose of the statute to require that facts exist to determine the loss
with reasonable certainty, the court held that damage had been
alleged with sufficient certainty to survive a summary judgment
motion by the attorney.24° While this is not a holding that such
232. Davis, 110 T.C. at 550.
233. See Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 56.
234. See id. at 57.
235. See id. at 58.
236. See Keegan v. First Bank, 470 N.W.2d 621, 623 (S.D. 1991).
237. See id. at 623.
238. See id. at 624.
239. Id.
240. See id.
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damages are not speculative, it does represent a retreat from the cases
holding such damages too speculative to survive dismissal.
C. A Remedy
The previous two subsections have suggested that, in some
"speculative damage" malpractice cases involving estate planning, an
argument can be made that the statute of limitations would be tolled
and the action would not accrue until actual damages occurred 241 and
that analogous situations to the "speculative damage" cases exists in
which courts have awarded damages despite the factual uncertainties
involved in these cases. The question remains whether there is a way
to avoid the problems involved in tolling the statute of limitations and
still satisfy the client's claim. A possible answer emerges from a most
unlikely source: an IRS Private Letter Ruling.
In 1997, the IRS issued a private ruling on the gift, estate and
generation-skipping tax consequences of a settlement agreement.242
Two taxpayers (husband and wife) established several trusts and
hired an accountant at an accounting firm to prepare the Form 709
(U.S. Gift and Generation Skipping Tax Return) reporting the gifts.
No election was made on the form to allocate any of the generation-
skipping exemptions of taxpayer or his wife to the trusts. Such an
election would have shielded all or some portion of the trusts from
the generation-skipping tax. The taxpayers sued the accountant and
the accounting firm which employed the accountant for
malpractice. 243  The suit was settled. The settlement agreement
established four trust funds. Each fund would reimburse one of the
originally established trusts or its beneficiaries which became liable
for any generation-skipping tax on account of the failure to allocate
exemptions on the returns. Any remaining portion of the fund would
be paid to taxpayer's children or the issue of a predeceased child. 4 It
should be noted that the initial funding of the funds was in an amount
241. In our hypotheticals, the death of the surviving spouse (or the later assessment of
estate tax) in the tax planning hypothetical, or the incurring of attorneys fees in defense of
a challenge by other beneficiaries in the rule against perpetuities hypothetical.
242. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-032 (Sept. 5, 1997), available in 1997 WL 543473.
243. Technically, the suit alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and
professional negligence. See id at *4.
244. The rulings on the tax questions are beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, the
IRS held that the funds were qualified settlement funds under Treasury Regulation
section 1.468B, the gross income of each fund would not include amounts transferred by
the firm or the accountant to satisfy a liability for which the funds were established, the
transfer of the settlement proceeds to the funds would not be gifts from the creators of the
trusts to their children, nor would the value of each fund be included in the grantors' gross
estate. The grantors would be treated as transferors of the bonds for generation-skipping
tax purposes. See id. See generally PRACrICAL DRAFTING 5125-5129.
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equal to the present value of the expected future generation-skipping
tax liability.245
With several minor changes, the settlement involved in the
private letter ruling could serve as a model for malpractice cases
which are now disposed of under the "speculative damage" rule.
Instead of dismissing the cases because the damages are speculative,
the court could order a trust to be created by the attorney. The
amount of the trust would be the present value of the future expected
liability.246 The computation of the expected future liability would
depend on the facts of the case. To use one of our hypotheticals as an
example, in the case where a general power of appointment was
mistakenly included in a credit shelter trust, the court could compute
the liability by adding the value of the credit shelter trust at the time
of the malpractice suit to the value of the marital (QTIIP) trust2 47 and
the value of the surviving spouse's assets, applying an interest factor
to account for growth, using standardized mortality tables to predict
the length of the surviving spouse's life, and adjusting for expected
spending. The tax on that amount would be computed, and
compared with the tax on the surviving spouse's estate without the
inclusion of the credit shelter trust. This amount, reduced to its
present value, would be the expected liability. The significant point is
not to analyze the mechanics of the computation but merely to show
that it can be done. Courts have experience with this kind of
computation.
When the amount is determined, it would be placed in a court-
supervised trust. Income would be retained in the trust.2  When the
surviving spouse died,249 the question of whether the inclusion of the
general power of appointment in the credit shelter trust250 caused
additional estate tax on the surviving spouse's estate could be
determined. Any additional estate tax generated would be paid from
the trust. Any funds in the trust remaining after payment of the
estate tax would be payable to the attorney or the law firm,
245. See PRACrICAL DRAFrING 5126.
246. Discounting the amount to present value would not be a problem. Courts have
used present value tables in malpractice cases. See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 650 A.2d 318,
325 (N.H. 1994) (court approved use of IRS tables to value life estate in a malpractice
case).
247. The QTIP trust will be included in the surviving spouse's estate under I.R.C.
section 2044.
248. This is necessary because of the discount of the expected future liability to present
value.
249. Or in other types of cases, when the value became ascertainable by virtue of
judicial decision or otherwise.
250. And the consequent inclusion of the credit shelter trust in the surviving spouse's
gross estate.
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depending on who provided the consideration for the establishment
of the trust. If the attorney provided the consideration individually
and had died, the residuary beneficiaries under the attorney's wilF51
would receive the trust proceeds. Of course, if the surviving spouse's
estate was insufficient to generate estate tax even with the inclusion
of the credit shelter trust, the entire court-created trust would be paid
to the attorney or the law firm.
This solution avoids the problems inherent in tolling the running
of the statute of limitations. The malpractice case is tried while the
evidence is fresh and the witnesses are available. In addition,
litigation over whether damages have been incurred or are
speculative would become unnecessary.
A not incidental benefit of this solution is that it could be used in
cases where the plaintiff had incurred attorneys fees, and a
malpractice cause of action had accrued, but the possibility of large
damages to be incurred in the future existed 252 The attorneys fees
incurred could be paid to the plaintiff directly and the possible future
damages could be placed in a trust of the type described above.
While courts may experience some difficulty in estimating the
possible future liability, the task should be no more difficult than
valuing a closely held corporation for federal estate and gift tax
purposes253 or other matters courts currently decide. The creation of
a trust in the speculative damage cases has the advantage of avoiding
the difficult factual question of determining what constitutes damage,
which has caused the courts a great deal of difficulty2 4 It has the
additional advantages of adjudicating the malpractice case when
witnesses are available and the evidence is fresh and avoiding tolling
the statute of limitations (or postponing the accrual of the cause of
action) for potentially long periods of time. Perhaps its most
significant advantage, however, is that it avoids dismissing the client's
malpractice action because damages are speculative. After all, in
many of these cases, the malpractice is clear. Denying the client's
recovery on what most non-lawyers would see as a technicality is not
calculated to improve the already low public image of lawyers.255
251. Or the attorney's heirs if the attorney died intestate. If the attorney's malpractice
insurer paid the amounts necessary to create the trusts, adjustments to the remedies would
be necessary.
252. One instance of such a case could occur in the rule against perpetuities in a
USRAP state example. A beneficiary might have employed an attorney to investigate the
possibility of a violation prior to the expiration of 90 years from the creation of the trust.
253. See, e.g., Davis v. C.I.R., 110 T.C. 530 (1998), for an example of the difficulty
involved.
254. See supra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
255. See Begleiter, supra note 1, at 263-79.
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Conclusion
This article has explored the question of the damages awarded in
legal malpractice cases involving estate planning. In many cases, the
damages recoverable are quite clear under the well established rules.
The plaintiff can recover the value of the lost bequest or the costs
incurred to repair the error. Attorneys fees involved in fixing the
error are recoverable as damages, but not fees incurred in bringing
the malpractice action. The troublesome cases occur where damages
may but are not certain to occur in the future. Two examples of such
"speculative damage" cases, one involving granting to the surviving
spouse a general power of appointment in a credit shelter trust and
the other involving a possible rule against perpetuities violation in a
USRAP state, were described. The current solution, to dismiss these
cases because no damage has occurred, appears unsatisfactory. Given
that such dismissal should be without prejudice, this solution is even
more unsatisfactory, because it presents the possibility of a refiling of
the malpractice action many years later. The experience of the courts
in such cases in attempting to formulate a workable test through
tolling the statute of limitations or deferring the accrual of the cause
of action was explored, but the results introduced complications
without a satisfactory solution to the problem. The cases could be
solved by a court-created trust with alternative beneficiaries to be
determined when the facts regarding damages became known. It is
respectfully suggested that courts explore this solution in future
"speculative damage" cases.
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